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INTRODUCTION: THE MORTGAGE MESS IS STILL THE PROBLEM 
For six years now, the nation has been struggling with the fallout 
of a residential real estate bubble and bust.  From their 2006 highs, 
housing prices are down nationally by 26.4%.1  In harder hit 
communities, the figure is significantly higher.  In Nevada, for 
example, house prices remain 51.6% below their 2006 peak levels.2  
This is notwithstanding continuing cyclical fluctuations pursuant to 
which prices routinely rise in the summer only to plummet again 
 
 † Robert Hockett is Professor of Financial and International Economic Law at 
Cornell Law School, Consulting Counsel at the International Monetary Fund, and recent 
Resident Consultant at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  He is also a Fellow of The 
Century Foundation; commissioned author for the New America Foundation; regular 
consultant to a number of domestic and international financial regulators and advocacy 
groups, including Americans for Financial Reform; and occasional consultant to Mortgage 
Resolution Partners, LLP, which is advancing a version of the plan advocated herein, 
which Mr. Hockett has been pushing since mid-2008.   
Thanks to Tobias Adrian, Mike Campbell, Bill Frey, Laurie Goodman, Howell 
Jackson, Darius Kingsley, Chris Mayer, Jamie McAndrews, Meg McConnell, Rep. Brad 
Miller, Sen. Don Riegle, Larry Rufrano, Bob Shiller, Joe Tracy, and other colleagues at the 
Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Department of 
Treasury, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development for helpful comments in connection with this Essay.  The views 
here expressed are nevertheless solely my own and not attributable without confirmation 
to anyone else named herein. 
 1 CORELOGIC, CORELOGIC HOME PRICE INDEX RISES BY ALMOST 10 PERCENT YEAR 
OVER YEAR IN JANUARY 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.corelogic.com/research/hpi/january-2013-home-price-index-report.pdf.     
 2 Id. 
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between annual ‘peaks.’3 
The cyclical character of post-bust housing prices undercuts 
occasional suggestions that the housing markets are ‘recovering.’  
Non-seasonably adjusted Case-Shiller 20-city composite housing price 
data compiled since July 2006 and represented below in Figure 1, for 
example, indicate that the highest post-bubble price peak prior to 
this past summer came not last year or the year before that, but in 
July of 2010, while early 2012 saw the deepest post-bubble trough 
since January 2009.4  After the recent 2012 seasonal peak, in turn, 
prices again dropped in October and November.  They then 
recovered some of that loss in December and January, but remained 
below their September seasonal peak.5  The point, then, should be 
plain: short-term cyclical gains do not constitute ‘turnarounds.’ Long-
term trajectories, which we can predict only partly by reference to 
recent trends, while also by reference to causally relevant conditions, 
are what matter.  Millions of deeply underwater and accordingly at-
risk mortgage loans are as causally relevant as can be.  We would be 
foolish, then, to view any one season’s price rises as indicia of ‘final 
recovery,’ just as we would be to view one cooler summer as ‘disproof’ 
of climate change.   
 
FIGURE 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The numbers on the y-axis indicate S&P/Case-Schiller home price index 
levels. 
 
 3 S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index Levels, S&P/CASE-SHILLER HOME PRICE INDICES 
(Standard & Poor’s, Americas), Mar. 26, 2013, available at 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/articles/en/us/?articleType=XLS&assetID=1
221192472066 (providing non-seasonably adjusted 20-city composite data); infra Figure 1 
(presenting in graphical form the non-seasonably adjusted Case-Shiller Home Price Index 
20-city composite data from July 2006 to January 2013). 
 4 See S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index Levels, supra note 3.   
 5 See id.  
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Yet while inherently variable home equity values have fallen and 
remain stubbornly low in relation to longer term trend, the fixed debt 
obligations incurred by so many American homeowners during the 
bubble years to buy homes—obligations that price-taking mortgagors 
had to take on to afford home ownership under bubble conditions—
have of course not.6  The consequence is that nearly eleven million 
mortgaged homes are now ‘underwater,’ market-valued at less than 
the debts they secure.7  That is nearly a quarter of all American homes 
with mortgages outstanding.8  Of these mortgaged homes, in turn, 
upward of three million are already in default, in foreclosure, or 
foreclosed and awaiting liquidation.9  Over two million Americans are 
twelve months or more behind on their mortgages, meaning that 
they are so delinquent as to be unlikely ever to catch up.10 
The upshot of all of these figures, where public policy is 
concerned, is that fewer than half of underwater home mortgage loans 
are now current,11 while more go delinquent each month.12  Together 
with loans that are already defaulted or delinquent, most housing 
analysts expect between 7.5 million and 9.5 million additional homes to 
go into liquidation over the next several years absent serious remedial 
action.13  These homes would liquidate into an already depressed 
market and would in turn create a backlog totaling approximately 
200% of all annual existing home sales in the U.S. at current sales 
paces.14  And we are not even halfway through our post-2006 housing 
 
 6 See Strengthening the Housing Market and Minimizing Losses to Taxpayers: Hearing Before 
the S. Subcomm. on Hous., Transp. and Cmty. Dev., 112th Cong. 1 (2012) (statement of 
Laurie S. Goodman, Senior Managing Director, Amherst Secs. Grp.), available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=0f96e
0ff-8500-41a5-a0f2-0139d0df2e07 (estimating that between 7.4 and 9.3 million borrowers 
had yet to face foreclosure and eventual liquidation, including between 2.4 and 3.3 
million borrowers with excellent payment history but underwater mortgages) [hereinafter 
Goodman Testimony]. 
 7 CORELOGIC, CORELOGIC REPORTS 1.4 MILLION BORROWERS RETURNED TO 
“POSITIVE EQUITY” YEAR TO DATE THROUGH THE END OF THE THIRD QUARTER 2012 1 
(2013), available at http://www.corelogic.com/research/negative-equity/corelogic-q3-
2012-negative-equity-report.pdf (“10.7 million, or 22 percent, of all residential properties 
with a mortgage were in negative equity at the end of the third quarter of 2012.”).  
 8 Id. 
 9 See Goodman Testimony, supra note 6, at 1; Barry Ritholtz, Fascinating Mortgage & 
Housing Data Points, THE BIG PICTURE (June 17, 2012, 9:38 AM), 
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2012/06/fascinating-mortgage-housing-data-points/. 
 10 See Ritholtz, supra note 9. 
 11 See Goodman Testimony, supra note 6, at 1.   
 12 See id. 
 13 See, e.g., id. (estimating that there are between 7.4 and 9.3 million borrowers who 
have “yet to face foreclosure and eventual liquidation.”).   
 14 See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE 
NATION’S HOUSING 2 fig.1 (2012), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/son2012.pdf (estimating only 
about 4 million existing home sales in 2012). 
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‘correction.’ 
The flesh and blood fallout effects of these arid numbers are 
devastating.  Communities see their residents rendered homeless and 
their property tax bases destroyed—ironically, just as abatement costs 
wrought by foreclosed or abandoned properties skyrocket.15  
Homeowners who are able to stay in their homes, for their part, not 
only lose neighbors and endure all the blight and lost value 
associated with empty and unmaintained neighboring homes but also 
see essential services cut, school districts retrenching, and economies 
shrinking—an aggregate monetized loss that is now estimated at $2 
trillion.16  Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that 
municipalities throughout the country—particularly those at the core 
of our recent mortgage loan bubble and bust—are now filing for 
bankruptcy.17  
It is likewise unsurprising that the macroeconomy continues to 
linger near Fisher-style, debt-deflationary slump—an economic 
rendition of chronic fatigue syndrome with no resolution in sight.  As 
a recent Federal Reserve Board white paper and other sources 
abundantly document, foreclosures and consequent slump in the 
housing markets feed back into the broader economy by diminishing 
wealth and consumer spending.18  That in turn lowers 
macroeconomic growth and employment—bad enough in 
themselves, yet also drawing more mortgages into the wave of 
 
 15 See Robert Hockett, It Takes a Village: Municipal Condemnation Proceedings and 
Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation, and Local 
Economic Recovery, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 133–34 (2012). 
 16 See id. at 150; John W. Schoen, Foreclosure Fallout Cost Nearby Homeowners $2 Trillion, 
Report Finds, NBCNEWS.COM: ECONOMY WATCH (Oct. 24, 2012), available at 
http://www.nbcnews.com/business/economywatch/foreclosure-fallout-cost-nearby-
homeowners-2-trillion-report-finds-1C6663420.  
 17 See, e.g., Steven Church, Dawn McCarty & Michael Bathon, San Bernardino, 
California, Files Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG.COM (Aug. 2, 2012, 7:38 PM), available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-02/san-bernardino-california-files-for-
bankruptcy-protection-2-.html.  The municipalities mentioned in this Essay, San 
Bernardino County, California and Wayne County, Michigan, will figure prominently 
below as exemplars of American municipalities hit hard by the recent mortgage price 
bubble and bust. See infra Part IV. 
 18 See, e.g., FED. RESERVE BD., THE U.S. HOUSING MARKET: CURRENT CONDITIONS AND 
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 3–4 (2012), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/housing-white-paper-
20120104.pdf (showing that decreases in home equity has significantly weakened 
household spending and consumer confidence) [hereinafter U.S. HOUSING MARKET]; 
William C. Dudley, Housing and the Economic Recovery, Remarks at the New Jersey 
Bankers Association Economic Forum (Jan. 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2012/dud120106.html (explaining 
that the decline in housing prices has created greater weakness in consumption and a 
decreased ability to refinance which traditionally provided an important channel for 
consumer spending).  
2013] ACCIDENTAL SUICIDE PACTS 59 
delinquency and default.19  Hence the familiar self-worsening 
‘downward spiral’ or ‘holding pattern’ of high underwater loan and 
foreclosure rates, which cause low growth and employment, which in 
turn cause yet more default and foreclosure, and so on.20 
Not all currently troubled mortgages, of course, are troubled by 
virtue of their underwater status.  Some homeowners, for example, 
face difficulty keeping current on monthly mortgage payments simply 
for reasons of temporary unemployment or underemployment, 
stemming as radial effects from the broader underwater-mortgage-
induced slump.21  For this class of mortgagor, the author and several 
New York Fed colleagues have designed a Home Mortgage Bridge 
Loan Assistance Program informed by a successful Pennsylvania 
program put into place during the steel slump of the early 1980s.22  A 
draft bill instituting the program, co-authored by the present author 
and one of the aforementioned New York Fed colleagues, is happily 
now under consideration in the state of New York.23   
But even assuming successful enactment of the author’s draft 
statute in New York and in other states, the nation’s far larger 
problem will remain unaddressed.  Temporary payment difficulties 
associated with above-water mortgage loans are, after all, but a 
miniscule part of the national mortgage problem.24  The key driver of 
 
 19 See Dudley, supra note 18; Hockett, supra note 15, at 134–35; Robert Hockett, Six 
Years On and Still Counting: Sifting Through the Mortgage Mess, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 373, 
374–75 ( 2013) .  
 20 See Hockett, supra note 19, at 374–75; see also Robert Hockett, Recursive Collective 
Action Problems, J. APPLIED ECON. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 13–15),  available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2239849 (discussing credit-fueled 
asset price busts and resulting debt deflation).  
 21 See James Orr et al., Help for Unemployed Borrowers: Lessons from the Pennsylvania Home 
Owners’ Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program, CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN., April 2011, 
at 1, available at 
http://newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues/ci172.pdfhttp://newyorkfed.org/resear
ch/current_issues/ci17-2.html. 
 22 See id. at 2–9 (detailing and explaining the mortgage bridge loan assistance 
programs).   
 23 See NEW YORK CITY BAR COMMITTEE ON BANKING LAW, PROPOSAL TO ADOPT THE 
HOME MORTGAGE BRIDGE LOAN PROGRAM 16–28 (2012), available at 
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/9_20072233-
BridgeLoanAssistanceProgram.pdf  (urging adoption of the Act and reproducing the text 
of the Act in its entirety).    
 24 Cf.  Michael V. Campbell & Robert C. Hockett, Some Homeowners Need Just Temporary 
Aid, AMERICAN BANKER (May 24, 2012, 10:59AM), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/Mortgage-bridge-loan-New-York-City-Bar-
1049605-1.html (noting that although some mortgages are in default due to temporary 
slump-induced unemployment, others are simply poorly underwritten and structured 
loans); Robert Hockett & Michael V. Campbell, A Bridge to Viable Mortgages, 
TIMESUNION.COM (June 14, 2012, 8:36PM),  
http://www.timesunion.com/opinion/article/A-bridge-to-viable-mortgages-3635265.php 
(arguing that mortgage problems caused by temporary causes have gotten little attention 
because many distressed mortgages are structurally unsound, not just temporarily 
60 CORNELL LAW REVIEW  ONLINE [Vol.98:55 
that story, again, is the large class of underwater mortgage loans 
singled out above.   
It is not hard to see why underwater mortgage loans would 
account for the greater part of our troubles.  Wrought by the long, 
bubble-associated rise in housing prices that ended in 2006, the so-
called ‘wealth effect’ supported growth-and-employment-maintaining 
consumer demand even when wages and salaries rose only slightly or 
stagnated.25  But the ‘effect’ runs both ways: homeowners with 
‘negative equity’ after the bust cut their spending the most, even 
before defaulting and foreclosing.26  Even tax cuts, rather than 
flowing mainly toward employment-supportive consumer 
expenditures, go largely toward trimming back overhung debt for 
this class of mortgagor.27  That might explain why the 2009 fiscal 
stimulus, tax-cut-laden as it was, did less than was hoped.28   
Now matters appear to be bound to continue as they are—
worryingly reminiscent of Japan’s two (and still counting) post-crash 
‘lost decades’—until mortgage debt overhang is pared back.29  
Interest-reduction and term-extension will not suffice; the overhang is 
the problem.30  But overhang can be trimmed in only one or both of 
two ways: (1) inducing a rise in home prices back toward their bubble 
year highs, and (2) writing-down debts toward their associated post-
bust collateral values.  Since a return to bubble era home prices 
seems neither feasible nor desirable, debt-reduction will have to be 
part of any bona fide move forward.  
I 
PRINCIPAL WRITE-DOWNS ARE STILL THE SOLUTION 
In light of the foregoing facts, it is now widely appreciated that 
 
troubled).  
 25 See Dudley, supra note 18 (describing the ways in which a strong housing market 
supports economic growth); Hockett, supra note 15, at 127–36.  
 26 See Hockett, supra note 15, at 134–35. But see Jennifer Robison, Local Spending is Up, 
May Be Linked to Mortgage Delinquencies, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Oct. 21, 2012, 7:53AM), 
http://www.lvrj.com/business/local-spending-is-up-may-be-linked-to-mortgage-
delinquencies-175130981.html (documenting consumer expenditure boosts once 
mortgage payments drop).  
 27 See Robert Hockett et al., The Way Forward: Moving from the Post-Bubble, Post-Bust 
Economy to Renewed Growth and Competitiveness 16 (Cornell Legal Studies, Research Paper 
No. 12-01, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1987139.  
 28 See Michael Grabell, Op-Ed., How Not to Revive an Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 
2012, at SR8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/opinion/sunday/how-
the-stimulus-fell-short.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 29 See ROBERT KUTTNER, A PRESIDENCY IN PERIL 66–68 (2010) (describing Japan’s 
folly in the 1980s). 
 30 See Hockett et al., supra note 27, at 4. See also Goodman Testimony, supra note 6, at 1 
(advocating for principal reduction modification as a means of reducing debt and 
strengthening the housing market).  
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principal write-downs must be done on a broad swath of underwater 
mortgage loans.31  Debt loss will have to be formally recognized in a 
manner commensurate with fair-value-accounted equity loss.  Even 
many creditors—the prospective first bearers of write-down-wrought 
losses—understand and embrace this hard truth.32  Write-downs are, 
after all, preferable to defaults, which plague underwater mortgages 
at ominously high rates—rates we will soon see in more numbers.  
Indeed, for much underwater mortgage debt, principal write-downs 
actually maximize value.33  We find evidence for this in the rates at 
which portfolio mortgage loan holders, as distinguished crucially—in 
ways the author will explain—from securitization trusts, write down 
debt.34   
Write-downs, then, will have to be done—both to salvage value 
for creditors and to trim macroeconomy-crippling mortgage debt 
overhang for homeowners and their communities.  The only question 
is how.  The answer at present, alas, depends tragically upon whether 
the loans in question are held in bank portfolios or by securitization 
trusts.  In the former case, write-downs are already occurring at 
significant and still increasing rates, while in the latter they are not.35   
Why?  Because bank officers know that underwater loans default 
at high rates, meaning that the expected values of such loans fall 
needlessly far short of their face values.36  It is accordingly rational for 
banks to write down such loans.  In so doing, the banks benefit not 
only themselves but also their debtors and the communities in which 
those debtors reside.  It is a case of convergent interests —of ‘win-win-
win’—though even here we can ‘win’ a lot more.37   
II 
WHY WRITE-DOWNS REMAIN RARE: SUICIDE PACT CONTRACTS AND 
CREDITOR COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS 
What about securitized mortgage loans?  How and why do they 
 
 31 See Hockett et al., supra note 27, at 4–7; U.S. HOUSING MARKET, supra note 18, at 
17, 20–21.  
 32 See Goodman Testimony, supra note 6, at 4–7. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See infra Part II. 
 35 See Dawn Kopecki & Michael J. Moore, JPMorgan, Wells Fargo Write Down Home-
Equity Loans, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-
12/occ-forced-jpmorgan-wells-fargo-to-write-down-home-equity-loans.html; David 
Streitfeld, Big Banks Easing Terms on Loans Deemed as Risks, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2011, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/03/business/03loans.html?_r=0. 
 36 See Kopecki & Moore, supra note 35.  
 37 See infra Parts V–VI.  This is true because, as we shall see, the externalities 
connected with price races give rise to a ‘last mover advantage,’ so that even portfolio 
loans are modified at suboptimally low rates, with many banks waiting for others to 
modify—or for some other price-raising ‘miracle’—to occur first.  See Hockett, supra note 
15, at 138–49.  
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differ from portfolio loans?  Unfortunately, a host of classic collective 
action problems stand in the way of the win-win solution in this case.38 
For one thing, there is a last-mover advantage where write-downs 
are concerned, owing to the positive externalities on later loans 
wrought by most write-downs on earlier loans.39  Of course, this 
particular challenge confronts portfolio loans too and therefore 
keeps modification rates lower than they likely would otherwise be 
even among banks.40  A battery of additional challenges in the case of 
securitized loans, however, reinforces portfolio loans’ relative 
advantage.  
Most decisive among the additional challenges facing securitized 
loans is contract rigidity.  The problem is that many of the pooling 
and servicing agreements (PSAs) pursuant to which most loans are 
securitized, drafted during the bubble years when few foresaw the 
prospect of an economy-wide housing price crash and many rushed 
to push or to purchase exotic new mortgage products, require 
unanimity or supermajority assent among mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS) holders before loans can be modified within or sold out of 
trusts.41  The problem that this poses is that fragmented owners of 
MBS cannot even find one another, much less negotiate with 
borrowers or would-be buyers and then reach agreement on what is 
best for all.  Making matters yet worse, the same agreements likewise 
prohibit or otherwise prevent even trustees and loan servicers, who 
are duty-bound to act on behalf of the MBS holders and hence could 
in theory address the owners’ collective action problems, from 
modifying or selling bad loans in sufficient numbers.42 
But there is more.  Many underwater homes also are subject to 
second liens that secure home equity lines of credit (HELOCs), taken 
out by mortgagors to supplement stagnating incomes during the 
housing boom years.  First lienholders do not benefit from 
 
 38 See Hockett, supra note 15, at 138–40 (providing background and more detail 
regarding the phenomena discussed in the following paragraphs); see also Robert J. 
Shiller, Reviving Real Estate Requires Collective Action, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2012, at BU6, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/business/economy/real-estates-
collective-action-problem.html (endorsing the analysis and plan presented in Hockett, 
supra note 15). 
 39 See Hockett,  supra note 15, at 138–42.  
 40 See id. at 142.  The solution offered here might also be put to good use in 
connection with some portfolio loans even though it is most dramatically called for in the 
case of PLS loans.  See infra Parts V–VI. 
 41 See Hockett, supra note 15, at 139–40. 
 42 See id.  In some cases, for example, PSAs allow no more that 5% of loans in the 
pool to be modified—a percentage that both reflects how little anticipation there was of 
across-the-board crash and has long since been reached in the case of most loan pools. See 
id.; Patricia A. McCoy, Barriers to Federal Home Mortgage Modification Efforts During the 
Financial Crisis 22–23 (Harvard University Joint Center for Hous. Studies, Working Paper 
MF10-6, 2010).  
2013] ACCIDENTAL SUICIDE PACTS 63 
modifications unless second lienholders modify, and hence are 
pecuniarily disinclined to modify on their own.  But many second 
lienholders, for their part, feel less pressure to modify.  The reason is 
that borrowers in need of liquidity after the bust tend to ‘prioritize’ 
their sole remaining sources of revolving credit—their  HELOCs—
and accordingly pay their second lienholders first.  These payments 
effectively reverse the legal order of creditor priorities between firsts 
and seconds.43  To add insult to injury, the second lienholders also 
quite often are banks—the same banks that service the first-lien-
secured loans.  This arrangement of course poses a formidable 
conflict of interest that further obstructs value-salvaging agreements 
among creditors.44   
There are additional obstacles to creditor-benefiting 
coordination.  Among them are bankruptcy law inapplicability as well 
as Internal Revenue Code and Trust Indenture Act uncertainties.45  
But the impediments already mentioned are enough to indicate how 
forbidding the obstacles to voluntary principal write-downs that 
would benefit creditors, debtors, and communities can be—
particularly for loans held in private label securitization (PLS) trusts, 
which do not benefit from any explicit or implicit federal guarantee. 
III 
COLLECTIVE AGENCY FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION, TAKE ONE:  FEDERAL 
FAILURES 
What then to do?  Well, to solve a collective action problem or 
cluster of the same, we require a collective agent.46  PLS trustees and 
loan servicers of the sort we just noted typically play this role.  But as 
discussed above, in the case of most PLS loans, these individuals are 
all either hand-tied, conflicted, or both.  Who then is left to act for 
the creditors and, by extension, the homeowners and spillover victims 
of local foreclosures and national slump?   
As it happens, governments and their instrumentalities are 
collective agents too.47  And in this context they are collective actions 
par excellence.  For governments are the sole entities capable of 
sidestepping PSA contract rigidities of the sort that now stand in the 
way of broad principal write-downs for PLS loans.  But which 
 
 43 See Hockett, supra note 15, at 142.  But see Donghoon Lee et al., A New Look at 
Second Liens, 569 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORTS 1 (2012), available 
at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr569.html (indicating that the 
second-mortgage-secured HELOC problem might not be as significant, empirically, as one 
might expect it in theory to be).  
 44 See Goodman Testimony, supra note 6, at 3.  
 45 See Hockett, supra note 19, at 391–93.  
 46 See Hockett, supra note 20 (manuscript at 15–16).  
 47 See id. at 15.  
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government should take up this mantle.  Should we be focusing on 
federal, state, or local governmental units?   
In 2008, this author and two other academics separately 
advocated federal action under a specific legal authority to which we 
shall presently turn.48  In 2010, higher-profile policy advocates, 
members of Congress, and other government figures added their 
voices to the call.49  But for a number of reasons, our federal 
government does not seem to be up to the task, nor does it appear 
likely to reach that point anytime soon.   
For one thing, the flagship federal Home Affordable Mortgage 
Program (HAMP) does not prioritize write-downs, and neither the 
present Congress nor any foreseeable future Congress are likely to 
change this.50  When HAMP is used for write-downs, moreover, it 
operates simply by paying the servicers, just as it does for all forms of 
modification.  It seeks to ‘bribe’ servicers with taxpayer money, in 
other words, paying creditors to do what already creates value for 
those creditors.51  More importantly, it offers no means of getting round 
PSA-rooted restrictions on servicer action.52  These issues render HAMP 
both irrelevant to PSA-hamstrung servicers and needlessly costly to 
public coffers—all while ‘austerity hawks’ and others constantly 
remind us that we live in tight times.   
The government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)—Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac—are for their parts steered clear of loan write-
downs by their regulator and current conservator, the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).53  The latter is, thanks to its 
current acting director, hostile to principal reduction as a matter of 
(as it happens, inapplicable) principle and would in any event write 
down principal at unnecessary cost through HAMP even if its acting 
director did not oppose the idea.  Indeed, the acting director of 
 
 48 See Robert C. Hockett, Bailouts, Buy-ins, and Ballyhoo, 52 CHALLENGE 36, 36–37 
(2009) (elaborating more fully on this argument and proposals made by the author in 
several op-eds over the autumn of 2008); Howell E. Jackson, Build a Better Bailout, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 25, 2008), available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2008/0925/p09s02-coop.html 
(arguing for alternatives such as the government purchasing actual loans); Lauren E. 
Willis, Stabilize Home Mortgage Borrowers, and the Financial System Will Follow 1–2 (Loyola-LA 
Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 2008-28, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1273268 (discussing government 
action such as eminent domain to solve issues with the current financial system).     
 49 See KUTTNER, supra note 29, at 55–87; Brad Miller, UnHAMPered, NEW REPUBLIC, 
Feb. 24, 2010, available at http://www.tnr.com/article/unhampered#.  
 50 See Hockett, supra note 15, at 143–45.  
 51 Id. at 146–47. 
 52 See id.  
 53 See Binyamin Appelbaum, U.S. Agency Bars a Plan to Reduce Home Debt, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 1, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/01/business/us-
agency-bars-fannie-and-freddie-from-reducing-principal.html.  
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FHFA factors HAMP fees into his cost-benefit analysis of possible GSE 
write-downs, thereby stacking the deck further against forward 
movement involving GSE-held mortgage loans.54   
Finally, because Congress has twice attempted and failed to 
include mortgaged homes in the Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy 
judges are unable to employ their equitable powers to salvage value 
among home mortgagors and mortgagees—unless, perhaps, millions 
of underwater homeowners take up a  ‘lease swap’ proposal made by 
the present author in 2011, which does not look likely.55  Again, then, 
neither this federal failure nor similar failures with respect to any 
other hypothetical legislation is likely to be reversed in the 
foreseeable future given the state of continuing paralysis in our 
divided federal government.  So no federal instrumentality appears 
presently equipped to do sorely needed, value-recouping write-downs 
on mortgage loan debt or apt to become thus equipped in the near 
future.   
What are the consequences of these failures?  In the year from 
September 30, 2011 to September 30, 2012, during which rates of 
principal reduction were increasing, only 58,549 underwater home 
mortgage loans saw principal write-downs.56  From the beginning of 
2008 through the end of the second quarter of 2012, moreover, only 
about 2.7 million loans were modified in any way by their servicers,57 
while approximately 40% of these modifications reduced monthly 
payments by less than 10%.58  All of this is the case notwithstanding 
abundant evidence, derived from portfolio loan-holders, that sizeable 
 
 54 See Edward DeMarco, Remarks at the Brookings Institution: Addressing the Weak 
Housing Market: Is Principal Reduction the Answer? 17 (Apr. 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2012/0410_housing_demarco.aspx; Letter from 
Edward DeMarco, Acting Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, to 
Congressman Elijah Cummings, Ranking Member, Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform (Jan. 20, 2012) (on file with author).  
 55 See Hockett, supra note 19, at 391–92.  For a description of the ‘lease swap’ 
proposal, see Robert Hockett, How About Home Lease Swapping as a Mortgage Market Cure?, 
BENZINGA FIN. NEWS (Oct. 14, 2011, 3:01 PM), 
http://www.benzinga.com/news/11/10/1987688/how-about-home-lease-swapping-as-a-
mortgage-market-cure; Robert Hockett, Post by Bob Hockett: ‘Lease Swaps’ as Mortgage Market 
Cure, DORF ON LAW (Oct. 16, 2011), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2011/10/post-by-bob-
hockett-lease-swaps-as.html.  For a defense of Robert Hockett's lease swap proposal, see 
Lynn M. LoPucki, House Swaps: A Strategic Bankruptcy Solution to the Foreclosure Crisis, 112 U. 
MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2014) (manuscript at 17–52), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2230117##). 
 56 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC MORTGAGE METRICS 
REPORT: DISCLOSURE OF NATIONAL BANK AND FEDERAL SAVINGS ASSOCIATION MORTGAGE 
LOAN DATA, THIRD QUARTER 25 tbl.17 (2012), available at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-
reports/mortgage-metrics-2012/mortgage-metrics-q3-2012.pdf. 
 57 See id. at 6 tbl.2. 
 58 See id. 
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write-downs do salvage sizeable value.59  And it is notwithstanding 
equally compelling evidence, found in the GSEs’ SEC filings, that 
underwater PLS loans that are not written down will default at 
remarkably high rates. For 2006 vintage loans, for example, 
approximately 71% of subprimes, 70% of option ARMs, 58% of 
variable rate loans, and a surprising 40% even of garden variety fixed 
rate mortgage loans will default.60 
IV 
COLLECTIVE AGENCY FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION, TAKE TWO:  THE 
MUNICIPAL EMINENT DOMAIN PLAN 
If it is not trustees, servicers, or federal government 
instrumentalities, then who is the proper collective agent equipped to 
address the collective action problems that now prevent principal 
write-downs?  The answer has been right before our noses all along:  
it is state and municipal governments, which (a) face the brunt of mass 
foreclosure and all of the ills that these mass foreclosures bring more 
directly than the federal government;61 and (b) have readily available 
authority, under both state and federal statutory and constitutional 
law, to address these emergencies just as directly.  We shall turn to 
the ‘how’ in due course, but first we shall elaborate somewhat on 
both (a) and (b). 
To start with the first point, although the underwater mortgage 
debt overhang crisis is crippling our entire nation’s economy, the 
worst of the problem is significantly localized in character.  There are 
some communities, for example, in which more than 80% of mortgage 
loans are underwater.62  In some, moreover, the degree to which the 
affected loans are underwater—or the quantum of ‘negative equity’—
is nothing short of remarkable.  There are communities that have a 
significant number of underwater mortgages with loan to value 
(LTV) ratios greater than 200%.63  This figure is historically 
unprecedented and affords at least some hint as to why some affected 
 
 59 See Goodman Testimony, supra note 6, at 4–6.   
 60 See FED. NAT’L MORTG. ASS’N, QUARTERLY REPORT (Form 10-Q) 111 (June 30, 
2012), available at http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/ir/pdf/quarterly-annual-
results/2012/q22012.pdf.   
 61 It is well known that Fannie and Freddie hold significant numbers of underwater 
loans in their portfolios and would benefit by writing them down for reasons given infra 
Part V, notwithstanding the misguided arguments to the contrary referenced supra in note 
54.  
 62 See, e.g., The U.S. Housing Crisis: Where are Home Loans Underwater?, ZILLOW, 
http://www.zillow.com/visuals/negative-equity (last visited Apr. 15, 2013) (inputting area 
code 30294 on March 17, 2013, indicates 81% of homes are underwater in that area 
code).  
 63 See, e.g., id. (inputting area code 30294 on March 17, 2013, indicates that there are 
significantly more mortgages with LTV ratios higher than 200% than there are mortgages 
at any other individual level of LTV displayed by Zillow). 
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communities are willing to act even before the nation as a whole 
might see fit to do so.  
The following county-by-county map affords a telling, if 
understated,64 summary overview of how localized the worst of the 
nation’s underwater mortgage loan problem actually is:65 
 
FIGURE 2 
CoreLogic Negative Equity: Negative Equity Share by County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CoreLogic Negative Equity Report, Q2 2012, Negative Equity Share 
 
If for the sake of illustrative case study we now concentrate our 
attention on two counties in two states that (a) appear to have been 
targeted with particular intensity by subprime lenders during the 
bubble years; and (b) have suffered accordingly since the bubble’s 
burst—San Bernardino in California and Wayne County in 
Michigan—the underwater figures and associated measures of poor 
economic health are remarkably high.   
In California, the figure is approximately two million underwater 
homes, representing 29% of the total statewide.66  Housing prices 
have decreased significantly over the past five years—27.3% for 
California as a whole67 and 41.34% for the Riverside-San Bernardino-
 
 64 The chart covers all underwater loans, hence it does not reflect distinctions 
between high LTV and lower LTV ratios on such loans.  
 65 CORELOGIC, CORELOGIC REPORTS NUMBER OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES IN 
NEGATIVE EQUITY DECREASES AGAIN IN SECOND QUARTER OF 2012 5 (2012), available at 
http://www.corelogic.com/about-us/researchtrends/asset_upload_file355_20017.pdf 
[hereinafter 2012 Q2 Negative Equity Report]. 
 66 Id. at 6.  
 67 Change in FHFA State House Price Indexes (Seasonally Adjusted, Purchase-Only Index, 
2012Q4), FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, 
http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=215&Type=summary (Mar. 17, 2013, 5:30 PM). 
68 CORNELL LAW REVIEW  ONLINE [Vol.98:55 
Ontario area specifically.68  Unsurprisingly, San Bernardino also has 
significantly higher unemployment and poverty rates than does the 
nation as a whole.  Its unemployment rate stands at 11.9% compared 
to a national figure of 7.9%,69 while its estimated poverty rate stands 
at 19.3% compared to a national figure of 15.9%.70  Scarce wonder, 
then, that it is among the first municipalities in the nation to 
consider a plan like the one on which we shall shortly elaborate.   
Turning to Wayne County, Michigan—where Detroit is located—
the figures are again telling.  Approximately 450,000 homes, 
representing a remarkable 32.8% of the total statewide, are under 
water in Michigan.71  Home prices statewide are down 12.6% over the 
past five years,72 while in Wayne County’s Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn 
area the figure is 26.61%.73  As with San Bernardino, Wayne County 
also shows similar disparities concerning indicators of economic 
health: its unemployment rate is 11% compared to the nation’s 
7.9%,74 while its estimated poverty rate is 25.9% compared to the 
nation’s 15.9%.75 
Yet as worrisome as all of these figures are, they are anything but 
fully contained within these two illustrative counties.  The cyclical 
patterns we noted earlier for the nation as a whole carry over to our 
worst hit states and their subdivisions as well.76  Meanwhile, a backlog 
of over 195,000 homes in California, with approximately 17,300 in 
San Bernardino alone, and over 60,000 homes in Michigan, with 
 
 68 Change in FHFA Metropolitan Area House Price Indexes (All Transactions Index, 
2012Q4), FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, 
http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=216&Type=summary (Mar. 17, 2013, 5:30 PM). 
 69 See Unemployment Rate by County, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/special/nation/unemployment-by-county/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (containing 
interactive map that displays unemployment statistics for a county as selected by the user) 
[hereinafter Unemployment Rate Chart]. 
 70 See UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY STATUS IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS: 
2011 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 1-YEAR ESTIMATES,  available at 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS
_11_1YR_S1701&prodType=table (allowing user to display reports on the national poverty 
rate and poverty rates by county) (national and San Bernardino County reports on file 
with author) [hereinafter Census Poverty Estimates].   
 71 See 2012 Q2 Negative Equity Report, supra note 65, at 6.  
 72 See Change in FHFA State House Price Indexes (Seasonally Adjusted, Purchase-Only Index, 
2012Q4), supra note 67. 
 73 See Change in FHFA Metropolitan Area House Price Indexes (All Transactions Index, 
2012Q4), supra note 68. 
 74 See Unemployment Rate Chart, supra note 69.  
 75 See Census Poverty Estimates, supra note 70 (national and Wayne County reports on 
file with author). 
 76 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, SPOTLIGHT 
ON THE HOUSING MARKET IN DETROIT-WARREN-LIVONIA, MICHIGAN MSA 2 (Jan. 2013), 
available at 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=HUDJanRegSCSL_Detroit.pdf 
(showing cyclical home price fluctuations for Detroit-Warren-Livonia, Michigan MSA). 
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approximately 14,700 in Wayne County alone, are now either in 
default, held in bank real estate owned (REO) portfolios or up for 
post-foreclosure auction.77 
So localities in many instances have significant incentives to 
address the underwater mortgage loan problem in a decisive manner.  
Under what authority, then, might they do so? 
Here too the answer lies right under our noses, though lawyers 
are apt to be first to detect it: using their traditional eminent domain 
powers—a legal authority enshrined in our state and federal 
constitutions for precisely such public exigencies as those that the 
foreclosure crisis presents78—states or their counties can simply 
purchase underwater mortgage loans from their holders at fair value, 
sidestepping PSA contract rigidities in order to do what too many 
PSAs presently prevent the loanholders and their fiduciaries from 
doing.  That is, again, to modify loans to render them payable.  The 
states or counties in question can then write down the loans to just 
under the values of the underlying homes, bringing the homes at last 
back above water.  And voilà, the problem is solved in one elegant 
stroke.79   
If necessary, the same authority can also be used to take second-
lien-secured loans at fair value, or even the liens that secure them 
while leaving the notes with their holders, effectively converting the 
latter into unsecured consumer debt.  That prospect could do 
wonders in bringing recalcitrant seconds to the table with firsts.  
Eminent domain alone makes this approach possible—again, because 
contract and holdup rigidities of this sort are precisely what 
inherently flexible eminent domain authority is for. Eminent domain 
enables political units to break through periodically emergent, 
market-paralyzing contract rigidities or holdout abuses in the name 
 
 77 California Real Estate Trends, REALTYTRAC,  
http://www.realtytrac.com/trendcenter/default.aspx?address=CA&parsed=1&stc=ca (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2013) (showing foreclosure trend data for the State of California); San 
Bernardino County, CA Real Estate Trends, REALTYTRAC, 
http://www.realtytrac.com/trendcenter/default.aspx?address=San%20Bernardino%20co
unty%2C%20CA&parsed=1&cn=san%20bernardino%20county&stc=ca (last visited Feb. 
25, 2013) (showing foreclosure trend data for San Bernardino County); Michigan Real 
Estate Trends, REALTYTRAC, 
http://www.realtytrac.com/trendcenter/default.aspx?address=MI&parsed=1&stc=mi (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2013) (displaying foreclosure trend data for State of Michigan);  
Wayne County, MI Real Estate Trends, REALTYTRAC, 
http://www.realtytrac.com/trendcenter/default.aspx?address=Wayne%20county%2C%20
MI&parsed=1&cn=wayne%20county&stc=mi (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (displaying 
foreclosure trend data for Wayne County).    
 78 See U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4 (providing the federal constitutional basis for 
eminent domain in stating “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation”). 
 79 See Hockett, supra note 15, at 162–70 (providing a fuller schematization of this 
plan).  
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of us all. 
But how are municipalities to purchase the loans or the liens, 
given that states and their subdivisions are even more strapped for 
cash these days than the federal government?  Here too the answer is 
simple.  Municipalities can finance the purchases with monies 
supplied by private sector investors, thereby avoiding all cost to the 
public fisc.  Investors can then be repaid from the proceeds of 
refinanced loans, or in the form of bonds issued against pools of the 
new, modified, and accordingly more valuable loans.  In this 
connection, crucially, the mentioned investors can and indeed 
should include current bondholders themselves, who can receive rights of 
first refusal to participate before any other investors are invited in.  
This inclusion will underscore the sense in which the eminent 
domain plan is meant simply to solve a collective action problem that 
dysfunctional PSAs now prevent trustees and servicers from solving 
themselves on behalf of their bondholding PLS trust beneficiaries.   
It is instructive to note that by working with the municipalities in 
the described manner, current bondholders will in effect piggyback 
on governmental authority to sidestep market-failure-causing 
dysfunctional contracts (the PSAs), and in so doing will at last get 
past those contract rigidities that currently prevent them from writing 
down principal and maximizing value on significantly underwater 
loans, just as the portfolio loan holders, unhampered by 
dysfunctional PSAs, are doing.   
To note that bondholders will effectively be ‘paying themselves’ 
less than face value for their loans is just a roundabout way of saying 
that they will be writing down principal.  Again, that is something 
which value-maximizing investors or their fiduciaries would do on 
their own if PSAs did not render such action legally impossible absent 
governmental exercise of contract-rescission authority through its 
eminent domain power.  Write-downs on deeply underwater loans 
boost the values of those loans by eliminating most of the very high 
default risk that otherwise afflicts them.  
In sum, then, the plan as schematically rendered looks like the 
figure below (single-headed arrows should be followed 
counterclockwise beginning at the upper left; double-headed arrow 
symbolizes identity or overlap between linked classes): 
 
FIGURE 3 
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Investors, including current bondholders, convey funds to trusts 
or accounts organized and maintained by municipalities.  The latter 
then use the funds to purchase deeply underwater loans with high 
default risk from current PLS trusts while continuing to pay out to 
their bondholder beneficiaries.  The municipalities then work with 
homeowners to modify the bad loans on which they owe and that the 
municipalities now hold.  Once the modifications are completed, the 
new loans are conveyed to the first-mentioned trusts, which convey 
resultant funds to the first-mentioned investors just as the PLS trusts 
do to their own beneficiaries.  This is the plan in broad outline. 
Of course, as the words ‘schematic’ and ‘broad outline’ suggest, 
this diagram shows only the basic structure of the plan.  More detail 
will have to be supplied, on a locality-by-locality basis, to render such 
a plan operational in any particular community.  Among the required 
further detail will be (a) selecting and preliminarily valuing the 
appropriate underwater loans; (b) approaching and securing the 
involvement of the investors; (c) commencing and conducting the 
legal proceedings pursuant to which eminent domain authority is 
actually exercised; (d) actually restructuring and perhaps 
resecuritizing the loans once they are purchased; (e) working with 
homeowners in connection with the foregoing; and (f) ultimately 
compensating the investors once the process is completed, among 
other things.  Moreover, effective discharge of these functions will 
require significant legal, financial, and counseling expertise.  Yet this 
can all be had and done, as the author has detailed elsewhere and as 
municipalities are already considering.80  
V 
THE PLAN IS LEGAL: FAIR VALUE AND PUBLIC PURPOSE 
But does this sort of thing actually occur, legally speaking? In 
other words, does the government really use eminent domain for 
more than just compulsory land purchases for the building of public 
infrastructure?   
Once again, the answer is straight-forwardly yes.81  Although non-
lawyers are not as immediately aware of the fact as are lawyers, cities 
compulsorily purchase property for public use at fair market value all 
of the time, and they do so with all manner of property—tangible and 
 
 80 See, e.g., Eleazar David Melendez, Brockton, Massachusetts, Considers Eminent Domain 
to Address Foreclosures, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2013, 2:19 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/11/brockton-eminent-domain-
foreclosure_n_2458369.html (last updated Jan. 15, 2013).  The author is also serving as a 
consultant for a number of cities considering the plan, but those cities’ identities are 
presently confidential.  
 81 See Hockett, supra note 15, at 157–70 (providing a more thorough legal analysis 
than the necessarily abbreviated one laid out in this Essay).  
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intangible, contractual and real-estate-related alike.   
Forms of intangible property analogous to mortgage loans that 
have been purchased under eminent domain authority by states or 
municipalities include bond tax exemption covenants,82 contract 
rights,83 insurance policies,84 corporate equities,85 businesses as going 
concerns,86 hunting rights,87 rights of way,88 and all manner of 
additional intangible property—even sports franchises.89  Given that 
the law does not distinguish between kinds of property that can be 
compulsorily purchased in eminent domain proceedings, it should 
come as no surprise that loans and liens in particular, as merely one 
form of contractual obligation among many, all of which can be 
condemned in eminent domain, are regularly condemned.90  Among 
those liens are mortgage loans and liens, as the U.S. Supreme Court 
and other state courts have long recognized.91 
The question, then, is not what kinds of property can be taken, 
but only whether the government pays fair value and whether a 
proper public purpose justifies the forced sale.  Preventing a self-
 
 82 See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 12-242ee–12-424yy (2011), available at 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2011/pub/chap208b.htm (containing innovative statutory 
provision enacted to prevent bond covenants from draining revenues from the fisc of the 
State of Connecticut by utilizing the State’s eminent domain power).  
 83 See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1977) (“Contract 
rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that 
just compensation is paid.”). 
 84 See, e.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577–79 (1934) (“Valid contracts are 
property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a State or the United 
States.”). 
 85 See, e.g., Offield v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 203 U.S. 372, 375–77 
(1906) (holding condemnation of shares of railway stock valid under state statute).  
 86 See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 3–4, 7–8 (1949) 
(holding that use of eminent domain where United States government sought to acquire 
right to temporary use and occupancy of defendant's laundry to provide laundry and dry 
cleaning service for members of the armed forces was justified). 
 87 See, e.g., Swan Lake Hunting Club v. United States, 381 F.2d 238, 240–41 (5th Cir. 
1967) (allowing condemnation of hunting rights via eminent domain).     
 88 See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 390, 407 
(1912) (permitting condemnation of right of way for public use). 
 89 See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 837 (Cal. 1982) (reversing 
the lower court’s grant of summary judgment against the city’s action to acquire by 
eminent domain the property rights of a professional football team). 
 90 See, e.g., Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998) (holding that 
interest income generated by certain account funds is private property belonging to the 
owner of the principal for Takings Clause purposes); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 
40, 48–49 (1960) (taking of materialman’s lien); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 551–53 
(1870).    
 91 See, e.g., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 596 (1935) (“If 
a part of the mortgaged property were taken by eminent domain a mortgagee would 
receive payment on a similar basis.”); W. Fertilizer & Cordage Co. v. City of Alliance, 504 
N.W.2d 808, 816 (Neb. 1993) (holding that “a mortgagee’s lien on real estate is an 
interest that may be subjected to a taking for a public purpose and, therefore, may be the 
subject of an eminent domain proceeding”).    
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amplifying tsunami of additional foreclosures, mass homelessness, 
blighted property, lost revenue base, and ultimate retraction of 
essential city services—in short, urban blight on a disastrous scale as is 
now seen in San Bernardino, Detroit, and all too many additional 
American cities—is widely recognized in the courts as the most 
compelling of public purposes justifying use of eminent domain 
authority.92 
What about valuation then?  How is ‘fair value’ determined?  
Would municipalities have to purchase underwater loans at less than 
fair market value in order to recoup sufficient margin to compensate 
the investors—including the current bondholders themselves—who 
put up the purchase money?  The answers are again rather simple.  
Let us address the two questions in turn. 
As for how valuation would be managed, there is nothing 
particularly recondite or mysterious here.  For one thing, where MBS 
associated with a particular pool of loans or with analogous pools 
trade on public markets at a discount, imputation of counterpart 
discounts to the underlying loans is arithmetically straightforward.  
And let there be no mistake: PLS bonds are trading at very steep 
discounts.93  Where the mentioned imputation methods are not 
available owing to missing markets, orthodox discounted cashflow 
methods are perfectly serviceable.  As noted above, for example, 
Fannie and Freddie, among other entities, publish expected default 
rates for various classes of underwater PLS mortgage each year in 
their SEC 10-Q filings.94 Recall that the default rate for 2006 vintage 
subprimes is about 70%, while the default rate for even relatively safe 
fixed-rates is 40%.95   
Other loan types show default rates between these extremes.96  
From such default rates—along with loan terms, recovery rates, and 
discount rates—the calculation of net present values (NPVs) is a 
straightforward exercise.  Our courts, which routinely hear 
arguments about valuation in multiple contexts and can always 
 
 92 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473, 478–79 (2005).  The Kelo 
decision makes for a particularly interesting comparison.  There, the U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld a taking of actual homes at fair market value from predominantly elderly residents 
with significant non-monetizable sentimental attachments to the homes, then conveyed 
them to Pfizer in the name of a particularly speculative claim that this would economically 
revitalize the city of New London, Connecticut.  Id.  What is contemplated here, by 
contrast, is a taking of underwater mortgage loans with no sentimental significance at 
truly fair value, in the name of a much more plausible claim that this will, by addressing a 
market failure, bring value to bondholders, homeowners, and wider communities alike.   
 93 See Current Markit ABX.HE Indicies, MARKIT (Mar. 25, 2013), 
http://www.markit.com/en/products/data/indices/structured-finance-indices/abx/abx-
prices.page. 
 94 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.  
 95 See id. 
 96 See id. 
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impanel experts in such cases, will be equipped to oversee all that 
transpires as required by law, ensuring procedural and substantive 
fairness to all parties.   
What about the putative need to bilk current investors to 
compensate new ones?  Would that not be unfair and undercut 
claims of public purpose?  This false concern is intimately bound up 
with another canard, widely propagated by certain participants in the 
securitization industry whose interests appear now to conflict with 
those of bondholders, homeowners, and their communities alike, to 
the effect that someone must ‘lose’ under the eminent domain plan 
if anyone is to ‘win.’  Must we rob Peter to pay Paul?   
The answer is once again no.  The charge that eminent domain 
proceedings must always represent a ‘zero sum game’ is simply false.  
Literally everyone can win under the eminent domain solution if the 
actual stakeholders think for themselves, examine the numbers, and 
do not squander resources—as certain participants in the 
securitization industry have (bluffingly) threatened will happen since 
the summer of 201297—on pointless litigation, lobbying, or strong-
arming efforts.98  
Key to understanding why the eminent domain solution can 
benefit everyone is the notion, discussed above, of a needlessly 
wasteful collective action problem.99 The solutions to such market 
failures, by definition, recoup needless losses that can then be 
distributed Solomonically over all stakeholders.  
To elaborate briefly, collective action problems characterize 
situations in which everyone experiences avoidable loss even when 
each person acts rationally, precisely because of the ways in which 
even rational actions can aggregate into dysfunctional outcomes 
when not orchestrated through coordinating instrumentalities like 
governments.  Credit-fueled asset price bubbles and busts are classic 
cases in point,100 as are monetary inflations,101 debt deflations,102 
‘bums’ rushes,’103 and ‘commons tragedies.’104  Indeed, so was the 
aforementioned credit-fueled housing price hyperinflation itself, 
 
 97 See Ben Hallman, San Bernardino Eminent Domain Fight Closely Watched by Other 
Struggling Communities, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 25, 2012, 3:29 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/01/eminent-domain-
mortgages_n_1836710.html. 
 98 The author passionately believes these opposing claims to be bluffs. See infra Part 
VI. 
 99 See supra Parts II–III. 
 100 See Hockett, supra note 15, at 138–42; Hockett, supra note 20 (manuscript at 12–
14).  
 101 See Hockett, supra note 20 (manuscript at 11–12). 
 102 See id. (manuscript at 14–15). 
 103 See id. (manuscript at 10–11). 
 104 See id. (manuscript at 2). 
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which is why individuals like the present acting director of FHFA are 
so terribly wrong in believing that ‘moral hazard’ is anything more 
than a de minimis policy interest where our ongoing underwater 
mortgage loan crisis is concerned.105 
As noted above, the nation’s ongoing mortgage and hence 
broader economic troubles are rooted in problems of precisely this 
collective action variety.  Indeed, they just are the bondholder 
collective action problems described earlier.  This is precisely where 
the eminent domain solution enters the picture in a way that can 
benefit literally everyone.  Its sole significance is its enabling of a 
collective agent other than the trustee or servicer, whom we found 
earlier to be hamstrung, to sidestep those market-paralyzing 
securitization contracts that private parties cannot sidestep. Eminent 
domain then allows refinancing of debt so that markets can return to 
doing what they normally do best: price goods efficiently and recoup 
otherwise lost value.  This recouped value—the surplus we gain by 
surmounting those market failures that our collective action 
problems and PSAs jointly constitute— then can benefit literally 
everyone.   
VI 
THE PLAN IS WIN-WIN-. . . WIN:  OF SURPLUS AND STAKEHOLDERS 
Everyone?  Yes—literally everyone can win if we do the thing 
right.  Consider the stakeholders class by class.  Under the eminent 
domain plan, current first lienholders receive fair market value for 
presently illiquid, unmarketable assets.  Insofar as they are among the 
investors who finance the compulsory purchases and receive 
refinanced and accordingly more valuable loans in return, they get a 
desired outcome that dysfunctional PSA contracts now prevent.  That 
is, of course, higher valued mortgage loan assets brought higher by 
modifications that PSAs presently prevent.106  They are also spared 
the significant litigation and liquidation costs associated with 
foreclosure. 
Next, consider investors in the written-down loans as a class, 
irrespective of whether they themselves are participating current 
bondholders.  These people for their part get modest returns on the 
funds that they lend to pay first-lien-holding trusts.107  Those returns 
 
 105 See DeMarco, supra note 54 (detailing Acting FHFA Director Edward DeMarco’s 
observations on the “moral hazard” issue); see also Hockett, supra note 15, at 142–49 
(arguing for how readily principal-reduction plans can avoid “moral hazard” issues).   
 106 See supra Part III. 
 107 It is instructive to note how the two step process under the eminent domain plan, 
pursuant to which an MBS holder first ‘pays herself’ for her loans and then holds more 
valuable, modified loans, simply simulates in two steps the one step act, commonly taken 
by portfolio loan holding banks, of writing down principal to increase a loan’s value.  The 
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stem from the value that is added by modification and consequent 
default-risk-reduction.  Since this value-addition is made possible by 
eminent domain and the private funds used to pay the required 
condemnation awards, it is fair and equitable for both to receive a 
part of the surplus that is generated.  And so they shall under optimal 
renditions of the eminent domain plan.   
Now consider the underwater homeowners, who had no choice but 
to pay bubble-determined prices for their homes during the bubble 
years and are no more responsible for the bust or for failure to 
foresee the bust than the lenders and securitizers—indeed they are 
likely less responsible.  This constituency now will receive an 
increment of positive home equity and sustainable debt loads, their 
piece of the refinance-generated surplus.  They will also be enabled 
to stay in their homes, which is itself ultimately an incalculable 
benefit.   
It should also be noted that neighbors and municipalities will finally 
stop losing home values and revenue bases, and everyone now suffering 
related forms of spillover loss thanks to our ongoing balance sheet 
recession will finally see real recovery.  That will be these 
constituencies’ piece of the surplus—or perhaps better put, this will 
be the positive externality that at last reverses the currently negative 
externalities that afflict them.  
Finally, consider the second lienholders.  Even they can benefit if 
paid sweeteners out of the value recouped by the write-downs 
effected through eminent domain, since in foreclosure—which, 
again, is overwhelmingly likely where mortgage debt is severely 
underwater—they get nothing.  Through the eminent domain plan, 
by contrast, all that the seconds stand to lose is the holdup power that 
some of them wield illegitimately owing to mortgagor liquidity 
needs—a power that, again, harms those first lienholders who legally 
stand ahead of them in the bankruptcy queue.108  This ‘loss’ is no 
more a policy-cognizable loss than any other loss of an ill-gotten, 
illegitimate gain.   
In the end, then, literally everyone can win under the eminent 
domain solution because it recoups presently lost value that can be 
equitably distributed.   
CONCLUSION:  IT TAKES A VILLAGE 
It is to be hoped, then, in light of the foregoing, that all might 
help all now by acting to salvage lost value.  As elaborated above, our 
 
reason for the second step in the PLS case is the PSAs, in which contracts require the 
interpolation of a step taken by government—the sole entity able to abrogate contracts—
in order to effect what could otherwise be done in one step by a private party.   
 108 See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
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continuing mortgage debt crisis is enormous in magnitude.  Many 
millions are directly affected, and scores of millions more suffer the 
ravages of that broader slump which the mortgage mess underwrites.  
Tragically, all of this is completely unnecessary, the product of no more 
than a structural problem that blocks us from doing what is best for 
everyone. 
What is best for everyone at this point is for creditors and 
debtors in the securitized residential real estate market to write down 
debt as those in the non-securitized market do.  All that stands in 
their way are certain improvidently formulated contracts drafted 
when few thought a nationwide real estate crash possible.  Only the 
public at large, through its governments, is legally able to get past 
those contracts.  And as this author hopes to have made plain, the 
governments best situated to do that at present, it seems, are the local 
ones.   
Here, as in so much else, then, it takes something other than 
individuals or federal agencies to break a tragic impasse.  It takes 
collective action at that level of government where the pain is felt 
most.  It takes, then, a village.   
